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Abstract  
In this study, we propose a meta-theoretical model for translation. In doing so, we start from 
a critique of bivalent thinking – rooted in classical logic – exposing unidimensionality as its 
fundamental weakness. We then consider how this problem has traditionally been addressed 
by proposing continua. While recognizing their cognitive, heuristic and didactic values, we 
argue that despite the promise of alleviating strict polarization symptomatic of binarisms, 
continua are still unidimensional and thus counterproductive to theorizing that seeks to 
capture translational complexity. As a way out of this impasse, building on the premises of 
fuzzy logic and the understanding that translation is a non-zero-sum concept, we suggest that 
theoretical concepts be couched in terms of multidimensionality (that is, contrasted with 
numerous oppositions, rather than a single one, as is the case with polar thinking). Finally, we 
suggest how our proposed approach can be translated into a practice of theorizing. 
 
Keywords: binary; classical logic; continuum; dimension; fuzzy logic; translation theory; zero-
sum thinking; multidimensional 
 
Introduction  
This article is a reaction to a certain methodological crisis which both of us started to notice 
independently of one another, working as researchers, translators, and translator trainers in 
two cultural contexts as different as Ireland and Iran. Consequently, what we make here is a 
methodological point which crosses many historical and geographical boundaries and concerns 
a broad range of theoretical approaches in translation studies. We believe that we have 
identified an issue affecting no single theory in particular but rather a widespread manner of 
theorizing: that is why we point to meta-theoretical implications. The selection of examples 
evoked to support our claims may seem somewhat haphazard (though we would prefer the 
term random, as in random sampling); indeed, we refer to various frameworks which are not 
always closely connected to one another but our argument does not depend on any potential 
parallels between them except for a widely shared meta-theoretical commitment to a certain 
kind of logic. John Ellis in his book Language, Thought, and Logic argues that “the most 
important steps in any theoretical enquiry are the initial ones” (1993, 14), and it is precisely 
these first, spontaneous, perhaps habitual, steps of logic that we are concerned with here. 
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However, in order to present our critique of the problem and suggest a way of addressing it, 
we first need to outline its context. 
 
Bivalent thinking 
In view of Michael Cronin’s remark that “translation is above all an initiation into unsuspected 
complexity” (2009, 218), it is rather ironic that much of theoretical reflection on translation 
has historically drawn on bivalent and dichotomous models, which often have a simplifying, 
reductionist and polarizing effect. In the Western tradition, many of the earliest recorded 
statements are binary in structure and antithetical in content: perhaps the most famous among 
these is Jerome’s principle non verbum e verbo sed sensum de sensu (“not word by word but 
sense for sense”). Another widely quoted foundational insight comes from Friedrich 
Schleiermacher who, having discussed the difficulty of bringing together the writer and the 
reader in translation, emphatically concludes that 
[…] there are only two possibilities. Either the translator leaves the writer in peace as 
much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace 
as much as possible and moves the writer toward him. These two paths are so very 
different from one another that one or the other must certainly be followed as strictly 
as possible, any attempt to combine them being certain to produce a highly unreliable 
result and to carry with it the danger that writer and reader might miss each other 
completely […] I will continue to insist that beside these two methods there can exist no 
third one that might serve some particular end. For there are no other possible ways of 
proceeding. (1813/2012, 49; emphasis added) 
Let us briefly consider Schleiermacher’s dimensional logic implicit in this argument. 
Translation, consisting of an encounter between the author and reader, facilitated by the 
translator, is conceptualized here as movement along a path. One of the two parties must 
remain immobile as the other is set in motion; otherwise there is a risk of setting out on 
divergent trajectories which might never cross. Schleiermacher appears to be saying that 
hitting a moving target is so difficult or unlikely – perhaps both – that for practical reasons it 
should not be attempted. So far, his logic seems credible, if a little overstated (after all, 
adjusting one’s trajectory to make or avoid contact with another moving entity is a fairly basic 
psychomotor skill). But why should successful contact be guaranteed when only one party is in 
motion? Experience with two- and three-dimensional models tells us that making contact may 
still be rather unlikely: while driving around a parking lot or practicing at a shooting range, we 
can avoid hitting obstacles and stationary targets with relative ease. This is a revealing point: 
Schleiermacher’s optimism about the inevitable contact between the writer and reader as one 
moves towards the (static) other discloses his presuppositions about the characteristics of this 
movement. His path is a straight line connecting two poles, and his logic permits only one 
dimension of movement. 
Let us make a mental note of this point – to which we will return in due course – but 
for now focus on another related element of Schleiermacher’s argument: his insistence on the 
binary nature of the choice at hand, reverberating in numerous dichotomies advocated in 
translation studies so strongly as to form a discernible tendency. Of course, a proclivity for 
binary distinctions is not limited to our discipline but has a long and firmly established tradition, 
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both intellectual and rhetorical, in the West. It can be traced back to the classical system of 
logical reasoning formalised by Aristotle, who proposed three interrelated fundamental laws 
which “apply without exception to any subject matter of thought” (Corcoran 1995, 423). These 
included the law of identity (“every thing is identical to itself”); the law of non-contradiction 
(“no thing having a given quality also has the negative of that quality”); and the law of excluded 
middle (“every thing either has a given quality or has the negative of that quality”) (Corcoran 
1995, 424). In this theoretical paradigm, the two categories are crisp, discrete, and mutually 
exclusive; there is no overlap or middle ground between them; no other options are available. 
With prolonged exposure to such logic, we start to believe “that our thinking should strive to 
eliminate ideas that are vague, contradictory, or ambiguous, and the best way to accomplish 
this, and thereby ground our thinking in clear and distinct ideas, is to strictly follow laws of 
thought” (Danaher 2004). Schleiermacherian echoes (“one or the other must … be followed as 
strictly as possible”) are loud and clear. Any thought that does not comply with these laws can 
be dismissed as illogical, invalid, or simply absurd. 
This mode of reasoning has been employed in countless debates between those 
advocating the dominance of nature over nurture, spirit over matter, sense over form, and so 
on. Postulating exclusive dichotomies, sometimes called bifurcation, polarization, or posing a 
dilemma, has long been listed among prime argumentative tactics (as well as logical fallacies, 
see e.g. Pirie 2006, 19–21; Bennett 2012, 119). A well-known example comes from Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s sarcastic essay “The Art of Controversy”, in which he offers the following 
stratagem: “To make your opponent accept a proposition, you must give him or her an 
opposite, counter-proposition as well. If the contrast is glaring, the opponent will accept your 
proposition to avoid being paradoxical” (1864/2008, 21). A rhetorical victory is achieved here 
by compressing all possible alternatives into a single dimension. 
It is worthwhile to consider the kind of epistemology and axiology embedded in 
Aristotelian logic deployed for argumentative purposes. Preying on the fear of paradox 
demonised as fallacious and academically unorthodox, it encourages or indeed forces binary, 
discrete and definite judgements, effectively creating a culture which promotes clarity and 
distinctiveness of concepts, as well as consistency of reasoning, often conceptualised as linear 
progression. The legacy of the dialectical method, proceeding from classical logic, can hardly 
be missed. Aristotle, Boethius, Abelard, Aquinas, and later Hegel and Fichte – as well as many 
other thinkers – have convinced us that one eventually gets to the truth by bouncing off two 
(and only two!) opposing views; a thesis provokes an antithesis, which leads to a synthesis. In 
her book Argument Culture, Deborah Tannen exposes the assumption broadly held in the 
Western world (specifically, in the US), that “everything is a matter of polarised opposites, the 
proverbial ‘two sides to every question’ that we think embodies open-mindedness and 
expansive thinking” (1998, 8). She notes that “our determination to pursue truth by setting up 
a fight between two sides leads us to believe that every issue has two sides – no more, no less: 
if both sides are given a forum to confront one another, all the relevant information will 
emerge” (1998, 10). In a similar vein, Anthony Pym observes that “the ideology of ‘one side or 
the other’ is deeply anchored in Western nationalisms” (2010/2014, 34), and Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s dichotomy between the Apollonian and Dionysian is one of many possible 
examples. 
Of course, the image of two “sides”, which profiles a horizontal and therefore non-
hierarchical distinction and reassuringly suggests a fair choice, is grossly misleading. One of the 
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main reasons for the dominance of binary distinctions is their rhetorical power stemming from 
an evaluative emphasis, however implicit. When examined closely enough, binaries, more 
often than not, are structured hierarchically and reflect underlying ideological, political and 
aesthetic sympathies. This is amply evidenced in our own discipline. Edwin Gentzler, 
commenting on a number of “binary oppositions that characterize translation studies 
discourse” (2012, 68) mentions the following conceptual pairs: “primary/secondary; 
original/copy; producing/reproducing; true/artificial; faithful/unfaithful; author/imitator; 
father/mistress; dominant/subservient; master/slave” (2012, 54). All these pairings express a 
contrast which is evaluative rather than merely descriptive. Our use of terminology throughout 
this article is meant to signal this evaluative dimension: we often speak of bivalent and not just 
binary thinking. 
 
From bivalence to polarity 
To be fair, despite their prominence in theoretical reflection on translation, bivalent 
distinctions have also been vigorously contested. For example, Pym in his critical analysis of 
Schleiermacher’s position focuses on the “basic binarisms of the choice itself” and asks the 
following questions: “Why did Schleiermacher recognize only two substantial methods? Why 
did this geometry of pairs exist before him? Why has it survived after him?” (1995). Pym’s 
hypothesis is that “Schleiermacher’s two opposed methods suppress a hidden middle term, 
the living translator, and that the whole of Schleiermacher’s text is designed to silence that 
middle term”. Pym hopes that if the text is to “break open”, “the resulting vision might then 
be projected onto the entire line of binary translation theories, ending with the most recent, 
found in Venuti” (1995). He challenges the law of excluded middle – probably the easiest one 
to undermine – as he seeks to find a third term, some middle ground between the two 
extremes. 
Other attempts at challenging Aristotelian logic have predominantly focussed on the 
law of non-contradiction, drawing explicitly on ideas derived from fuzzy logic which postulates 
unsharp boundaries between classes, and can therefore account for imprecision and partiality 
(Zadeh 2010, ix; see also Zadeh 1965). For example, in his book On Definiteness, Andrew 
Chesterman, starting with the English articles as “prototypical realizations of definiteness” 
(1991, 2), argues that the definite–indefinite divide is not so much discrete as scalar, mapping 
it onto a fuzzy-set framework. He concludes that the need for the application of fuzzy logic into 
issues related to language “is a reflection of the more general non-exactness that is increasingly 
seen to hold between knowledge or theory and the facts of reality” (1991, 195) and the shift 
or the necessity of the shift from the outdated Aristotelian logic to fuzzy logic can be regarded 
as a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense (1991, 201). In a similar spirit, in 1999 Maria Tymoczko 
insisted that “in cultural matters such as translation one cannot generalize from classical logic 
nor can one apply the law of excluded middle”, and declared that “fuzzy logic rules translation 
studies as it does most disciplines that analyze human culture” (1999/2014, 140).  
Given the confident ring of these (and similar) statements made by prominent 
translation theorists towards the end of the twentieth century, one would expect that the 
debate is – or at least should be – over: that translation studies as a discipline had largely 
abandoned the unhelpful insistence on crisp boundaries and binary distinctions. But despite 
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these declarations, two decades later, a propensity for binary oppositions cannot be 
considered a thing of the past nor a weakness found only in overly simplistic models. Gentzler 
argues that a binary tradition of thinking about translation  
[…] extends to contemporary translation theory. Even the more advanced translation 
studies models developed by Itamar Evan-Zohar in Polysystem Studies (1990) and 
Gideon Toury in Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond (1995) use pairs such as 
adequate/acceptable, source text/target text, primary/secondary, 
producer/consumer, center/peripheral and canonical/noncanonical to construct their 
system of investigation, and translations are categorised accordingly. More 
“progressive” and cultural studies-oriented formulations by translation studies scholars 
also remain suspect. Venuti […] too perpetuates a binary logic by continuing a 
faithful/free dichotomy, reformulated in his work as fluent/foreignizing. Binary 
oppositions are scattered throughout his work – premodern/modern, invisible/visible 
– and although he favours the foregnizing and visible […] by privileging one of the binary 
elements, he still perpetuates the traditional paradigm. (Gentzler 2012, 53–54) 
Notwithstanding Venuti’s protests against reducing his earlier theorisation to “a neat binary 
opposition” (1995/2008, 19; see also Delabastita 2010, 130–132), his latest leitmotif, namely 
“a more rigorously conceived hermeneutic model that views translation as an interpretive act” 
(Venuti 2013, 4), is developed in a strict bivalent opposition to “an instrumental model” which 
sees translation as “the reproduction or transfer of an invariant contained or caused by the 
source texts” (2013, 3). The evaluation involved in this distinction is unmissable. The 
hermeneutic model is rigorous and brings with it explanatory power; instrumentalism, on the 
other hand, “is, in a word, a falsehood that cannot offer an incisive and comprehensive 
understanding of translation” (2013, 3). Linguistically, the disfavoured position is reduced to a 
suspiciously muddled “-ism”: it is noteworthy that there are no analogous references to 
“hermeneutism”. This axiological charge explains why there is no middle ground and why 
Venuti does not seem to acknowledge any positive elements of the instrumental model or 
admit any blind spots of the hermeneutic one. The difference between them is a matter of 
truth and brooks no compromise. Indeed, any attempt to suggest a compromise would be seen 
as a symptom of adhering to the discredited instrumentalism and smuggling it back in disguise. 
As a result, the discussion smoothly slides from a theoretical to an ethical level: those who hold 
the opposite view – and there are no other than these two views to be held, the difference 
being unidimensional – are not just resisted but shamed for promoting falsehood. 
Interestingly, Brian Mossop in his forum provocation piece in a recent issue of Translation 
Studies, despite arguing in favour of a radically opposite view concerning invariants, confronts 
us with a strikingly similar binary choice: “either one is oriented toward invariance (with 
minimization of variance) or one is not … there are exactly two mental stances that can be 
adopted by someone who is deriving one text from another” (2017, 332–333). Again, any 
middle ground is “logically” and rhetorically excised. 
Gentzler’s critical comments about the perpetuation of the traditional bivalent 
paradigm echo Kaisa Koskinen’s reservations, expressed over a decade earlier, regarding the 
deconstructionist project of feminist translation aimed at “resolving hierarchical oppositions 
(like faithful/unfaithful or original/translation)” (2000, 44); a process which, in her view,  
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requires two steps: first it needs to be turned upside down, changing the previously 
subordinated, negative or invisible pole into the dominant, positive position. And this 
seems to be what feminist translation has been doing: changing the order and forcing 
us to reconsider the traditional role of women/translators. But the second step is also 
necessary: deconstruction is only completed after both poles are redefined so that 
neither is on top and the violent opposition is resolved. Thus far, feminist translation 
theories have mainly concentrated on overturning the opposition male/female, 
positing the feminine/maternal images as qualitatively higher and morally more 
tenable than their masculine/paternal counterparts which are depicted as highly 
suspect. (Koskinen 2000, 44)  
Consequently, deconstruction “can be seen first and foremost as a continued project of 
dismantling the binary oppositions and revealing, even celebrating, the underlying 
ambivalence” (Koskinen 2000, 93). A significant contribution was made by postmodern, post-
structural and especially postcolonial theorists who often applied “[t]he notion of borderline 
cases, liminal spaces, and in-betweenness” in problematizing binary relations (Koskinen 2000, 
71). The crucial thing in this process is “not to reverse the hierarchy … but to accept the 
inseparability of the two poles. They only exist in relation to each other. Thus, the negative is 
not external but internal to the positive pole” (Koskinen 2000, 93). Writing about complexity 
theory, Kobus Marais comments that “in its anti-reductionist stance, [it] … shares the 
deconstructivist fight against binaries … However, where deconstruction wishes to dissolve the 
binaries, complexity theory maintains them. It assumes the existence of logical binaries and 
claims that one has to live with them” (2014, 42). Despite the polemical tone, this is not a 
radically different stance. Even though these (meta-)theoretical positions are much more 
sympathetic to the complexities of translational phenomena by admitting a substantial degree 
of relativity and ambivalence, the persistent reliance on the prototypically binary concept of 
poles holds them back. 
 
The promise of the continuum 
Now, a theoretical concept which intuitively appears to overcome some limitations of bivalent 
logic – without compromising its undeniable rhetorical power – is a continuum. While 
preserving two basic orientations, it allows us to be more nuanced in our judgements. 
Researchers representing a variety of backgrounds and theoretical traditions have drawn on 
the concept of the continuum to stress the wealth of intermediary options between the 
extreme points on the scale. Here are several typical and rather randomly selected examples. 
Whilst considering multiple Western translations of Sei Shônagon’s Pillow Book, Valerie 
Henitiuk stresses that “the term ‘translation’ is used in its broadest possible meaning to 
encapsulate a vast range of linguistic and cultural transfers along a continuum from literal to 
free” (2008, 2). Sonia Colina, in her examination of empirical evidence for a functionalist 
approach to assessing translation quality, repeatedly refers to the concept of “the evaluation 
continuum (i.e. good, bad and in-between translations)”, noting that “the categories under 
evaluation … are not discrete and bounded, but rather form a continuum each” (2008, 123–
124). Reine Meylaerts and Maud Gonne argue that translation studies can “contribute to a new 
and flexible conceptualization of agent roles within a continuum of overlapping practices 
between author, multilingual writer, self-translator, translator” (2014, 147). Many other 
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examples could be quoted; there is no shortage of continuum-based thinking in translation 
studies. (Please make a mental note of these three particular continua, as we will re-visit them 
later.) 
The continuum model is not only invoked in discussions of actual translations 
positioned on a scale stretching between two extremes but also in relation to abstract 
theoretical constructs, the most conspicuous of which is equivalence, featuring in varying 
degrees in many definitions of translation (e.g. Jakobson 1959; Catford 1965; Nida and Taber 
1982; Newmark 1988; Koller 1995; see also Halverson 1997). Somewhat symptomatically, most 
theoretical accounts of (or around) this concept are fraught with binary dichotomies: Nida’s 
formal equivalence and dynamic equivalence (1964, 159–171); Catford’s formal 
correspondence and textual equivalence (1965, 27); Newmark’s semantic translation and 
communicative translation (1988, 38–56); House’s overt and covert translation (1997, 66–71); 
Toury’s adequate and acceptable translation (1995/2012, 70); Venuti’s foreignizing and 
domesticating translation (1995/2008, 19); or more recently Pym’s natural and directional 
equivalence (2010/2014, 6–42); the list could go on (see Pym 2010/2014, 32–34). 
At this point, several caveats should be made. First, our critique of continuum-based 
thinking in translation theory may look like cutting a few corners by lumping together certain 
authors and their models and thus implicitly mapping them onto one another. While there are 
ways in which it makes sense to compare, for example, Nida’s and Venuti’s respective 
conceptual oppositions, these certainly cannot be reduced to each other. Secondly, some 
influential typologies in translation studies are not binary at all (Pym 2010/2014, 33); Dryden’s 
triad: metaphrase, paraphrase, and imitation (1991) and Koller’s typology of equivalence: 
denotative, connotative, text-normative, pragmatic, and formal (1995, 191–222) are two good 
examples. Once again, we do not wish to conflate all these models or disregard the differences 
in their respective emphases but make a broader methodological point. In our view, the myriad 
dichotomies of equivalence and, consequently, translation types, attest to the enduring legacy 
of Aristotelian logic, though at a less discernible level. Regardless of the differences between 
the particular aspects profiled by these dichotomies, they all share an underlying image 
schema which is strongly linear. 
Equivalence may be the most visible example of a continuum but it is by no means the 
only one. In his highly influential work, Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond, Gideon 
Toury makes the following comments on his concept of norms: 
The norms themselves are far from monolithic […] [C]onstraints on any kind of 
behaviour can be described along a scalable continuum anchored between two 
extremes: general, relatively objective rules on the one hand, and idiosyncratic 
mannerisms on the other. Being intersubjective in nature, norms therefore occupy the 
central part of the scale, very often amounting to the whole continuum minus the small 
patches taken up by the two extreme points. All in all, these constraints form a graded 
continuum reflecting their proximity to (or distance from) either pole. (Toury 
1995/2012, 65; emphasis added) 
The key property of a continuum which makes it useful as a theoretical construct is its non-
discreteness. A continuum is appealing as an antidote for bivalent logic because it allows 
intermediate states and potentially infinite distance between the extremes. This is precisely 
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how (and why) its proponents deploy it. For example, countering Theo Herman’s criticism of 
“the pattern of binary oppositions with which polysystem theory operates” (1999, 119) and 
drawing on the work of Pilar Godayol (2002), Ira Torresi argues that “the laws governing texts 
are ever-changing and do not come out of binary oppositions, but are the expression of the 
constant dynamic flow … of change in the polysystem” (2013, 218). Torresi concludes that 
“what Hermans … saw as ‘dual structures and oppositions’, like the centre/periphery 
dichotomy, can actually be reconceptualized as continuums running fluidly between two 
opposite positions” (2013, 219). 
Even though this reconceptualization might be taken to alleviate the dangers of strict 
bivalence, categories-cum-continua, or indeed continua-cum-categories often have limited 
explanatory power when applied to actual translations. Let us consider a specific example. In 
the art and culture section of BBC Persian, Farahmand (2014) argues how the mistranslation 
of a single word in Mikhail Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the Don has affected the whole 
narrative in three different translations into Persian. This epic novel depicts the lives and 
struggles of the Cossacks at the beginning of the twentieth century. Cossacks are a group of 
mainly East Slavic people, inhabiting predominately Ukraine and Western Russia. In all three 
translations of the novel into Persian (none of which was made from the original Russian), for 
one reason or another, Cossacks ( کازاکاه  in Persian) has been translated as Kazakhs ( قازقاه  in 
Persian; arguably more familiar to Iranians due to the geographic proximity between Iran and 
Kazakhstan), a Turkic people of Eastern Europe and some parts of Central Asia. As these two 
words clearly designate two different peoples, for a reader with an interest in the historical 
narrative, the translations are extremely confusing. It is puzzling that a Turkic and Muslim 
people from Central Asia pop up in European Russia, have Russian names, profess Christianity 
and embrace a culture which bears little resemblance to that of Kazakhs. In this particular case, 
“domesticating” the text in one aspect has “foreignized” it in another, so any attempt to place 
these Persian translations on the foreignizing–domesticating scale seems both impossible and 
irrelevant. A linear, unidimensional model simply does not work here. 
 
Zero-sum thinking and simultaneous category membership 
In our view, inserting a continuum between two conceptual opposites, by solving one problem, 
creates another one, perhaps somewhat subtler to detect but not less detrimental to the 
quality of our theoretical reflection on the realities of translation: the fallacy of zero-sum 
thinking presupposing inverse correlation between categories held as the opposite poles. Here 
are two examples of the reductionist effect of the continuum model. Elsewhere in his 
Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond, Toury discusses the concept of translatability 
which he defines as “the initial potential of establishing optimal correspondence between a TL 
text (or textual-linguistic phenomenon) and a corresponding SL text (or phenomenon)”, noting 
that “this correspondence can vary greatly. In fact, it may be anywhere between 0 and 1, non-
existent and absolute, without ever coinciding with either of the two extremes” (Toury 
1995/2012, 38). Following a similar line of reasoning, in his brief discussion of fuzzy logic as 
partial set membership, Anthony Pym discusses a situation in which 
[…] an element can be a member of two different sets but to different degrees: a 
solution might be 80 percent foreignizing and 20 percent domesticating, for example: 
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when “McDonald’s” signs appear all over the non-American world, they are foreignizing 
because from a foreign culture yet domesticating because, for the mostly young 
clientele, they have always been there. (Pym 2010/2014, 103) 
Both Toury’s and Pym’s examples rely on a unidimensional model stretching between two 
extremes, as they highlight a range of intermediate options. However, the idea of expressing 
partial set membership in terms of percentages misses the point because it requires that the 
respective values reflecting the degree of membership always add up to the whole (the 
numerical value 1 or 100%); in other words, someone’s gain must mean another’s loss. 
Methodologically, this is not at all different to the Aristotelian requirements of non-
contradiction and excluded middle. All sections of the cline must be accounted for and there 
should be no overlaps between them. Let us note that there is no reason for these conditions 
to hold, apart from the habit of falling back on traditional logic. Under fuzzy set membership, 
the explanatory power of Pym’s example is preserved – in fact, we would suggest, reinforced 
– even if the respective percentages do not add up to a hundred. Imagine two scenarios: (i) a 
solution which is, at the same time, 16 percent foreignizing and 37 percent domesticating; and 
(ii) one that is 52 percent foreignizing and 79 percent domesticating. If scenario (i) leaves us 
with a feeling that something is still unaccounted for, and scenario (ii) makes us think of 
overlaps – or indeed if we are struggling to make sense of these descriptions – this is evidence 
that we are applying zero-sum thinking: the logic inherent in a percentage-based 
conceptualization. But, despite their logical unorthodoxy, do the resulting mental images not 
problematize this complex phenomenon more radically than Pym’s neat, classical-logical 
distribution 20–80?  
Of course, it is difficult to explain what these values correspond to (some inherent 
properties of the text? perceptions of the end-users?) – however, the real problem is not so 
much with the actual percentages or the method of their calculation as with a unidimensional 
paradigm. If we are to draw on models derived from the classical set theory and speak of 
fractions or percentages – in short, linear continua – we must recognise that they are based 
on zero-sum thinking. A failure to notice this initial unexamined assumption is likely to result 
in “logical mistakes that are virtually impossible to recover from once made” (Ellis 1993, ix). To 
use a more vivid and concrete image, both Toury and Pym invite us to envisage a pie being 
divided between two people: the larger the slice eaten by one of them, the smaller the slice 
left for the other. However, not only is this scenario plagued by the old binary disease (there 
are exactly two consumers in the picture), but it also assumes that no slices or indeed crumbs 
can be left uneaten and there are no extra helpings. But, of course, actual acts of pie sharing 
are not as simple as this model would suggest. To mention just a few parameters: there may 
be more (or fewer) than two people at the table – indeed, their number may change from one 
moment to the next, as some come and others go; certain slices may be left uneaten; if after 
the first round some diners fancy more food, another pie can be served. Now, if this is a hugely 
inadequate model for theorizing a relatively straight-forward process of pie sharing, why would 
it apply to the complex realities of translation?  
Where the pie analogy fails is that in the world of translation it is possible both to eat 
your pie and have it – which leads us to the second major contribution of fuzzy logic, namely 
simultaneous category membership. On a linear scale, by moving away from one extreme you 
necessarily move closer towards the other – because a scale permits only one dimension of 
movement. But translation is a not a zero-sum game so that a loss, for instance, in form is not 
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necessarily balanced by a gain in function. For example, as numerous actual instances of 
audiovisual translation in Frederic Chaume’s book (2012) attest, in lip synchronization pursued 
in dubbing, form and function are positively correlated, so that for a translation to be 
functional, it is necessary for it to be formal; in fact, preserving the form can to a large extent 
also guarantee the function. Similarly, as cited by Chesterman (1998, 25), Georges Perec’s 
lipogrammatic novel La Disparition (1969/1988), which entirely avoids the letter “e”, is a good 
case in point. This novel was translated by Adair (1994) into English under the title of A Void, 
re-invoking a similar stylistic legerdemain in that it avoids the use of the same letter 
throughout. The stylistic quality of the translation of this novel throughout also clearly indicates 
that translation dualities are not necessarily mutually exclusive but complementary. In this 
translation, form and function are so inextricably linked to each other that the loss of one 
would inevitably lead to the loss of the other. 
A translation can be a full member of two (seemingly exclusive) sets at once. For 
example, although European Union laws are products of complex translation processes, since 
they are equally valid in all language versions, they are not translations in effect because there 
is no source text which they could be said to represent. Production-wise, they are translations; 
law-wise, they are not (Pym 2010/2014, 103). Of course, in one sense the translation of EU 
laws is not a special case; given the massive migration in today’s globalized world, official 
translations of driving licences, marriage and birth certificates, title deeds, identity documents, 
etc., which are de jure as valid as their original texts, have become commonplace. In a different 
domain, Hephzibah Israel (2010, 181) mentions the case of the English King James Bible, itself 
a translation, which gradually began to function as the original text for Indian translators in the 
nineteenth century. Any dispute over meaning was finally settled by referring to the King James 
Version rather than to the Greek and Hebrew originals. Therefore, depending on our 
perspective, the King James Version is both the source text and a translation.  
In these and many other cases, indicating this dual status by placing such texts in the 
centre of a hypothetical continuum stretching between the poles of source and target cultures 
(or between the “original” and “copy”) would make little sense: they are not amorphous 
instances of “neither-this-nor-that” but very strong members of both opposite categories at 
once. Similarly misguided attempts are attested by Lourens de Vries who discusses the 
traditionally binary distinction between an oral and written culture: 
[A]n almost impenetrable barrier was erected between oral communication and 
written communication […] Orality and literacy were understood as two separate, 
contrasting worlds. This dichotomous thinking, the “Great Divide” of orality and 
literacy, was so strong that counterexamples did not break the paradigm; rather, this 
led to the recognition of “mixed” forms that were placed on an “oral–written 
continuum” that maintained the basic opposition between the oral and the written. (de 
Vries 2015, 146) 
The problem, once again, is with the underlying logic. Thinking in terms of “in between”, 
enforced by the prototypical continuum concept, risks a reductionist, “streamlining effect” 
(Baker 2010, 113). Tymoczko captures this point well when she writes: 
Although the views of poststructuralists have been enormously useful in undermining 
structuralist binaries, there are limitations in the concept of between as a solution to 
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the problems of structuralism, for not all alternatives to a polarity or a binary figuration 
lie on a line between the two contrasted elements [...] Thus, not all polarities have a 
single continuum that we could call in between. (2010, 221–222, original emphasis) 
By now, it should be clear that proposing continua as an antidote to the problem of translation 
binaries is fundamentally misguided. The problem is not, and has never been, in the insufficient 
gradation of binaries. Rather, what Tymoczko and others are drawing our attention to – 
without putting it explicitly in these terms – is that a continuum as a theoretical concept is 
unidimensional. 
 
Beyond unidimensionality 
This is where we arrive at the centre of our argument and touch its most important 
implications: an adequate meta-theoretical model for translation. Despite the frequent 
admissions that translation is an extraordinarily complex concept, phenomenon and practice, 
much of the theoretical reflection devoted to it – as we sought to demonstrate – draws on a 
simplistic logical paradigm and a unidimensional model. 
When Stanisław Barańczak (1990, 11–12), one of the most eminent Polish literary 
translators, ridicules the popular aphorism according to which translations are like women – 
either beautiful or faithful (and challenges the centuries-old metaphor of translations as les 
belles infideles; cf. Godayol 2013), he does so not only on the grounds of its sexist stereotypes 
but, above all, the “idiocy” of its unidimensional logic. Setting aside the elusive categories of 
beauty and fidelity and focusing on the logical problem of their alleged inverse correlation, 
could adding another dimension help solve it? Definitely so: in a coordinate grid, each element 
of a binary can indeed gain a high or low score without affecting the score of the other element. 
Such a two-dimensional model is an improvement in that it allows us to conceptualise a range 
of phenomena without falling into the zero-sum trap. Similarly, referring to a conceptual 
structure underlying the polysystem theory, Torresi aptly points out that 
“centre” and “periphery” are more productively understood as areas, as the terms 
suggest, rather than points in space, with a continuum of positions between the two. It 
is therefore entirely possible for a work of literature to be somewhere off-centre but 
not quite peripheral, as in the case of “minor classics”, or conversely located at or near 
the periphery of the polysystem as a whole but so central for one minority group of 
readers that it stands out as a kind of milestone. (2013, 220) 
In fairness, a considerable part of translational thought already evokes two dimensions when 
it speaks of areas, fields, territories, zones, borders, and so on. The prevalence of this imagery 
is likely to come from its connection to travel, transfer and, more generally, movement. 
Likewise, the widespread idea of the successive “turns” in translation studies (e.g. Snell-Hornby 
2006) presupposes movement over a flat surface. The ability to turn around is a major 
improvement over sliding back and forth along a single scale: it enables exploration of hitherto 
invisible or inaccessible spaces, and makes room for various, not just straight routes. 
However, two-dimensional models are still quite poor in representational and 
therefore theoretical terms: a series of turns in the same direction will eventually bring you to 
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the initial orientation, if not necessarily the same position. Think of the earth: even though it 
is spherical, we only meaningfully experience its surface. Our position on and movement across 
the globe are, most of the time, two-dimensional, but the moment we depart from the surface 
by either descending underground or climbing a multiple-floor structure, we are not making 
any progress towards any of the cardinal directions: the compass becomes useless. A GPS 
device can show you where you are on the footprint of a multi-storey car park but not at which 
level. 
A low-dimensional model is incapable of adequately representing, let alone successfully 
explicating (and that is what models are for, after all), the realities of a higher-dimensional 
phenomenon. Even though we are very familiar with two-dimensional representations of 
three-dimensional objects (e.g. physical maps, photographs, X-rays, TV screens, etc.), such 
projections are necessarily, in a strict sense, reductive: depth can only be rendered by use of 
illusion involving the manipulation of light, perspective or focus to simulate a realistic viewing 
experience. No amount of turning a photo around will disclose what is behind the object 
depicted on it. Humbling as it may sound, a translation theory which relies on prototypically 
two-dimensional concepts – such as, for example, area, field, zone, and even the celebrated 
turn – has merely matched the level of representational (un)sophistication typical of Edwin A. 
Abbott’s (1884/1992) imaginary Flatland. 
Following up on this realisation, we suggest that successful efforts of developing a 
properly complex theoretical model for translation must be committed to a higher 
dimensionality. There are already several approaches employing three-dimensional concepts. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s idea of “thick translation” (1993), based on Clifford Geertz’s “thick 
description” (1973: 3–30), literally adds depth to flat and therefore deceptive representations. 
The Actor-Network Theory (e.g. Latour 2005) invites us to imagine complex, entangled, 
multilateral and dynamic structures vitally depending on broadly understood translation. A 
related concept of a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 2004/1987) – a non-hierarchical, non-
linear, organically flexible structure – has recently been deployed in support of “ubiquitous 
translation” (Blumczynski 2016; see also Arduini and Nergaard 2011). In a similar spirit, Douglas 
Robinson describes the dimensional expansion of his earlier, linear understanding of 
translation dynamics (the force coming from the author towards the translator is subsequently 
re-directed towards the reader) under the influence of Martha Cheung, “who understood that 
dialogue Daoistically […] in terms of what we might want to call pan-attentiveness, since the 
forces of change are everywhere, and we interact with them continually, on many levels at 
once” (2016, 9). 
 
Multidimensional thinking 
Our proposed solution to the problem of lower-dimensional models has an ambition of 
avoiding the trap it has exposed. Rather than suggest a replacement for earlier approaches 
(that would be a very bivalent ambition, would it not?), we seek to extend them into a higher 
dimensionality. We do not want to abandon the existing set of concepts and invent new ones; 
our chief meta-theoretical tenet is that any useful concept is potentially multidimensional (that 
is, contrastable with numerous oppositions, rather than a single one, as is the case in polar 
thinking). This is consistent with findings of cognitive linguistics: polysemy, the fact that a 
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particular word may evoke different, loosely connected or virtually unconnected meanings, is 
a rule rather than an exception. Vocabulary of a natural language tends to be polysemous, and 
the various latent meanings only become salient when contrasted with a specific conceptual 
opposition; in short, “words are protean in nature” (Evans 2009, xi). We suggest that one 
productive approach to imagining, describing and thinking about this polysemy is to do so in 
dimensional terms. In order to illustrate this approach, we will return to some continuum-
based ideas mentioned earlier and try to re-imagine them according to a fuzzy, 
multidimensional logic. 
The concept of “the quality continuum” repeatedly invoked by Colina (2008) in her 
study on translation quality evaluation presents a good case of the streamlining effect we have 
been critiquing. The very need to operationalize such a rich category as translation quality into 
a range of specific descriptors (ranging from functional adequacy to terminological 
correctness) already signals the various interdependent dimensions into which it extends. This 
disaggregation of interrelated factors, typical of quantitative methodologies, may indeed 
provide “a way of assessing textual and communicative/pragmatic adequacy of translations, 
rather than being limited to grammatical and or stylistic errors at the sentence level, and 
changes in meaning” (2008, 107); but squeezing all these properties, and many others, back 
into a single “quality continuum” is a big methodological and logical leap. True, evaluating 
translations in various professional and pedagogical settings normally means placing them on 
a linear scale used for benchmarking or grading. But the fact that the same grade or numerical 
value is routinely assigned to translations which deserve it for different reasons renders “the 
quality continuum” useless in theoretical terms. Rather, it is by exploring these reasons, by 
probing into the various, often conflicting, dimensions of quality, that we can understand this 
complex notion better. Simply arranging translations from best to worst, and putting numerical 
values on them, may perhaps be a starting point but definitely not the end result of a 
meaningful study into translation quality. The assumption that translation quality can be 
productively – and not just pragmatically – conceptualized as a linear continuum is, in our view, 
highly debatable.  
And what about the AUTHOR – MULTILINGUAL WRITER – SELF-TRANSLATOR – TRANSLATOR 
continuum? To be fair, the researchers who postulate it openly focus their gaze on agent roles 
and admit that the respective practices overlap (Meylaerts and Gonne 2014, 147). But it is still 
problematic to accept that, in this or any other aspect, a greater distance must separate an 
author from a self-translator than from a multilingual writer – a conclusion probably 
unintended by the researchers but forced by the continuum concept they invoke. This 
unidimensional logic conceals other possible configurations: for example, could authors and 
self-translators share something with each other, bypassing multilingual writers (who are 
posited as an intermediate link on the continuum)? When an author has limited command of 
the target language and works in tandem with another person, is not such assisted self-
translator closer to the category of a (monolingual) author than a multilingual writer? Would 
not such a self-translator require translational assistance – for instance, when answering 
questions at press conferences, giving interviews, or negotiating with publishers in the target 
language – much like a monolingual author but unlike a multilingual writer? Could not some 
(monolingual) authors have less agency than some (self-)translators simply because of legal 
peculiarities? The case of Stanisław Lem’s Solaris comes to mind: the publisher of the English 
translation (made indirectly from a French one), as the copyright holder, for several decades 
successfully blocked any initiatives by Lem’s estate to commission a re-translation directly from 
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the original Polish (see Blumczyński 2010). All these are, of course, speculative questions which 
may or may not be worth exploring; the relevant point is that a low-dimensional approach 
renders them “illogical” and thus brushes them outside the scope of scholarly interest. In the 
multidimensional model we propose, these four roles could be lifted from a continuum which 
enforces a linear optics and instead be imagined as fuzzy nodes within a living rhizome, 
connected to other nodes both directly and via other nodes. Difficult as it is to represent this 
network of relationships using two- or even three-dimensional imaging, would it not do more 
justice to its complexity? Would it not encourage us to pursue certain directions of enquiry 
without a fear of contradiction, the big whip of Aristotelian logic? 
In a similar vein, the popular LITERAL – FREE continuum, from the rich cluster of 
significations evoked by these two concepts, arguably isolates one dimension, roughly 
corresponding to the source – target orientation. But we can also think of other binaries 
involving each one of these concepts, for example LITERAL – LIBERAL; LITERAL – FIGURATIVE; LITERAL – 
POETIC; LITERAL – SPIRITUAL; even, somewhat paradoxically, given the shared etymology of these 
two, LITERAL – LITERARY; and so on. FREE comes with just as broad a range of dimensional 
extensions along the lines of FREE – CONSTRAINED; FREE – ATTACHED; FREE – ENSLAVED; FREE – OCCUPIED; 
FREE – SYSTEMATIC; FREE – PAID; and so on, including FREE – LITERAL. Some of these pairs involve a 
clear evaluative pattern, others less so and their axiology is therefore prone to a greater 
contextual variation (for example, to be described as liberal may be considered a complement 
or an insult, depending on one’s political views). Many of these concepts jointly contrasting 
with LITERAL are related to one another but differ in their emphases, however subtly. Even close 
synonyms (e.g. FREEDOM and LIBERTY, as well as their adjectival forms) highlight various semantic 
nuances and carry different connotations. Moreover, in some contexts, certain pairs may not 
even be oppositions (e.g. in cabalistic traditions, LITERAL and SPIRITUAL are closely connected). 
The complexity of such a conceptual bundle is further illustrated by the fact that a negation 
can bring together all these divergent threads in a focal point: an approach described as NON-
LITERAL may also be, without contradiction, LIBERAL, FIGURATIVE, POETIC, SPIRITUAL, LITERARY, and so 
on. Various negation patterns can break the unidimensionality of a conceptual opposition and 
expose its evaluative axes stretching in various directions (for example, consider the pairs 
FORMAL – FUNCTIONAL and FUNCTIONAL – DYSFUNCTIONAL which, when conflated, would render formal 
translations dysfunctional). A statement such as “X is a more literal translation than Y, which 
by comparison is freer though systematic and yet non-liberal” follows a convoluted conceptual 
trajectory which zig-zags across several dimensions, making it impossible to position these two 
hypothetical translations on the initial LITERAL – FREE continuum without a sense of logical 
discomfort. 
That is because we intuit multiple dimensions here: the imagined movement from 
LITERAL to FREE and then to SYSTEMATIC (setting aside the bifurcation towards NON-LIBERAL), does 
not quite bring us back to where we started. Literal translations do not have to be systematic 
(or unsystematic), any more than free translations do not have to be liberal (or metaphysical, 
or unpaid, etc.). We do not have enough space here to explore in detail other multi-furcating 
trajectories – but probably do not need to in order to demonstrate how they explode the linear 
continuum from within. You may think of the following progression of conceptual oppositions: 
LITERAL – POETIC – PROSAIC – IMAGINATIVE – DULL – SHARP – SAFE – DANGEROUS and so on, potentially ad 
infinitum, and only partially tongue in cheek. 
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 It is possible to imagine a translational process which is simultaneously moving away 
from both poles of the LITERAL – FREE continuum: for example, ACTIVIST may contrast with either 
one of them. In the field of Bible translation, versions such as The Inclusive New Testament 
(1994) insert (or restore, depending on your perspective) gender-neutral references in 
traditionally gendered passages (e.g. Ephesians 5:22 is rendered “Those of you who are in 
committed relationships should yield to each other” rather than “Wives, submit yourselves to 
your own husbands” [New International Version]), arguing that the spiritual message of the 
source text is obscured by a masculinist bias, so removing it will bring us closer to the original 
inclusive sense. Does this approach lead us towards a more literal or a freer translation? “Yes”, 
we are tempted to answer in the spirit of fuzzy logic. We would argue that these two 
dimensions (LITERAL – FREE; ACTIVIST – UNINVOLVED) are, in logical terms, mutually problematizing. 
They signal that moving away from one orientation does not necessarily bring you closer to its 
“logical” opposition; the zero-sum rule does not apply here.  
 As three-dimensional beings, we may find it difficult to envision a greater number of 
dimensions, and indeed attempts at “envisioning” will probably hold us back from embracing 
a higher multidimensionality. In this article, we have deliberately refrained from providing any 
visual representation of our proposed logical model because that would be self-defeating: 
doing so would immediately subject it to the limitations we have been describing. Let our 
scholarly imagination be fuelled by the realization that some branches of theoretical physics, 
such as string theories, count dimensions in double digits. We may not always be able to chart 
these dimensions using a set of coordinates but should not discard our intuitions when they 
tell us that a certain phenomenon belongs in a different dimension than others. It is these 
intuitions, rather than linear logic, that may deserve to be trusted. 
 
Towards a practice of theorizing 
Research articles with a strong theoretical focus run the risk of being too abstract in their 
implications and too vague in their applications. Therefore, in this final section, we would like 
to suggest translating our proposed approach into the practice of theorizing and at the same 
time bring together the main threads of the argument we have been spinning. 
Let us state it loud and clear: we are not arguing that binary oppositions and linear 
continua be banished from any discussions of translational phenomena. We recognize that 
they may have valid cognitive, heuristic and didactic applications. It may be useful to isolate a 
particular dimension for a closer examination whilst (temporarily) excluding others from 
consideration. The ability to make distinctions which are often bivalent is an indispensable 
cognitive skill: “Without the cognitive tools of differentiation life would be characterized by 
entropy. In order to define their place in the world individuals are in continuous search for 
identity and difference” (Ibsch 2010, 464). For pragmatic reasons, humans need to be able to 
quickly categorize others as friends or foes and view alternative courses of action as good or 
bad. Such binary categorizations may lack finesse but they are sometimes necessary; there are 
situations in which any decision is better than none. Even as we challenge the explanatory 
power of binaries and, by extension, continua, we employ in our own argument a number of 
bivalent distinctions, even as fuzzy and subjective as helpful/unhelpful, simplified/complex, 
suspect/reliable, and so on, drawing on their intuitive axiological charge and rhetorical power. 
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They serve as mental shortcuts in heuristic and pedagogical endeavours and help gain a quicker 
understanding of complex problems. 
However, we should not forget that these heuristic and pragmatic applications are just 
that: they speed up our problem-solving and decision-making processes but are 
counterproductive to theorizing that seeks to account for complexity. When multidimensional 
translational concepts (such as quality, agency, representation, etc.) are squeezed into a 
unidimensional scale, they risk not just being caricaturized but deformed beyond recognition. 
As Ellis points out, a formulation of facts may embody “far reaching decisions about how to 
conceive those facts” and determine “what kinds of things facts are to be”, thus committing 
us conceptually and theoretically “in ways we might not have wished to be committed had we 
thought it through before the decision was made” (1993, 15). We would therefore postulate 
that before deploying, however casually, any continuum-based theoretical account, 
consideration be given to the following questions: (1) is the proposed approach comfortable 
with a zero-sum logic and its ramifications?; and (2) can simultaneous membership in both 
categories posed as polar opposites be ruled out? If the answer to both these questions is 
negative – which we hope should be the case in a significant number of situations – that should 
lead to re-assessing that particular instance of continuum-based theorization. Coming back to 
the choice postulated by Schleiermacher: leaving the writer in peace and setting the reader in 
motion (or vice versa) is no guarantee that the two will be brought closer together; in fact, they 
may well be pushed further apart. 
This brings us to the final point. We have sought to demonstrate the benefits of 
multidimensional conceptualization of categories, complemented by insights from fuzzy logic, 
in theoretical accounts of translational phenomena. But these benefits have a much wider 
reach. Our proposed model invites a certain epistemological attitude and ethical stance. To say 
“I am not sure”, “It depends”, or “This issue really belongs in another dimension” is not a sign 
of poor scholarship, imprecise measurement, academic permissiveness or simply dodging the 
question. Rather, it reflects a commitment to resist the pressure – built into some of the earlier 
scholarly traditions – to seek clarity and certainty in the face of complex, confusing and 
ambiguous experience. The fuzzy logician Bart Kosko notes aphoristically: “Precision up, 
information up. Information up, fuzz up” (1993, 37). Pursuing precision means being ready for 
more, not less, fuzziness. This includes the willingness to re-examine not just the boundaries 
of our categories, be they sharp or fuzzy, but the categories themselves. A multidimensional 
approach sensitises us to a key methodological question: “where the categories we work with 
come from, and how rigid we perceive them to be”, as Mona Baker (2009, 224) puts it. One 
reaction in face of this question, she suggests, is “to refrain from using categories which pre-
exist the research and analysis and instead allow such (temporary) categories to emerge from 
the analysis itself” (2009, 224). We believe that a meta-theoretical commitment to 
multidimensionality is conducive to this practice by questioning the logic of certain conceptual 
oppositions, and thus problematizing the concepts themselves.  
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